Türkiye's Global Diplomacy: Gaza, UN Security Council Reform and the COP31 Climate Agenda

Why It Matters

Türkiye's multilateral agenda rests on one argument: global institutions work better, and are more legitimate, when more states have a real voice in them. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's phrase “The world is bigger than five” (Dünya beşten büyüktür) targets the veto-holding structure of the UN Security Council. Ankara applies the same logic to Gaza and Palestine, to Zero Waste and its COP31 presidency, and to its partnerships with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), Africa and the Gulf.

For analysts, the useful question is where Ankara's positions overlap with those of other powers and where they diverge. There is broad agreement that the Council needs reform, but little agreement on the model. On Gaza, many states share Türkiye's call for a ceasefire and a two-state outcome, yet differ sharply on Hamas, on Israel's right of self-defence and on Türkiye's role as a mediator.

Background

How the Security Council is built

The UN Charter (1945) gives the Security Council primary responsibility for international peace and security (Article 24). Five states hold permanent seats and the power to block substantive decisions: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States (Article 27). The Council was enlarged only once, in 1965, from 11 to 15 members, by adding four elected non-permanent seats. Today ten elected members serve two-year terms.

Amending the Charter requires a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members (Articles 108 and 109). Every permanent member therefore holds a veto over reform itself. Talks in the General Assembly’s Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) process, begun in 2009, have produced no agreed text. In April 2022 the Assembly adopted, by consensus, the “veto initiative”, which requires a General Assembly debate after any veto is cast. The 2024 Pact for the Future again committed members to Council reform without settling its form.

Gaza and Palestine

Türkiye recognized the State of Palestine in 1988, and the General Assembly granted Palestine non-member observer state status in 2012. After the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel, Israel launched a military campaign in Gaza, invoking self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Council’s response was repeatedly split. The United States vetoed several draft resolutions calling for a ceasefire between October 2023 and November 2024. Resolution 2728 (March 2024) demanded a ceasefire for Ramadan after Washington abstained. The General Assembly, where no veto exists, passed ceasefire and humanitarian resolutions by large majorities. In July 2024 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory. Several European states recognized Palestine in 2024 and 2025. A US-brokered ceasefire framework in October 2025 involved Türkiye, Egypt and Qatar as mediators.

Climate and Zero Waste

Türkiye ratified the Paris Agreement in October 2021 and set a 2053 net-zero target. The Zero Waste initiative, championed by First Lady Emine Erdoğan, began as a national programme in 2017. A UN High-Level Advisory Board on Zero Waste was set up in 2020. The General Assembly then proclaimed 30 March the International Day of Zero Waste, first observed in 2023. At COP30 in Belém (November 2025), parties agreed that Türkiye would host COP31 in Antalya in 2026 and hold the presidency, while Australia would preside over the negotiations.

Regional outreach

The Turkic Council founded in 2009 became the Organization of Turkic States in 2021. Its full members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan, and it adopted a Turkic World Vision 2040 document that year. Türkiye has hosted Africa partnership summits (2008, 2014, 2021) and expanded its diplomatic network on the continent. Since the 2021 Al-Ula declaration ended the Gulf rift, it has also deepened ties with Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Key Players & Positions

The permanent five and reform blocs

• United States: In September 2024 the US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said Washington supports two permanent seats for Africa (without new veto rights) and a rotating seat for small island developing states. Washington has not endorsed limits on the existing veto.
• France and the United Kingdom: Both say they support expanding both categories of seats, including permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan and for African representation. France also promotes voluntary veto restraint in cases of mass atrocities.
• Russia and China: Russian officials say they back greater Asian, African and Latin American representation but oppose changes that would increase Western weight. China says developing countries, especially African ones, should be better represented, and cautions against artificial deadlines.
• G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan): Seek permanent seats for themselves.
• African Union: The Ezulwini Consensus calls for two permanent African seats with full veto rights and five non-permanent seats.
• Uniting for Consensus (UfC): A group including Italy, Pakistan, Spain and Türkiye opposes new permanent seats and proposes longer-term elected seats with the possibility of re-election.

Gaza and Palestine

• Israel: The government says its operations respond to the 7 October attacks, in which about 1,200 people were killed and around 250 taken hostage. It designates Hamas a terrorist organization and generally criticizes Council and Assembly texts that do not condemn Hamas or secure the hostages’ release.
• United States: US officials explained their vetoes by arguing that drafts did not condemn Hamas or risked undermining hostage and ceasefire negotiations.
• Arab states: The Arab League and the OIC call for a ceasefire, aid access and a Palestinian state, building on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Egypt and Qatar act as principal mediators. The March 2025 Arab League plan addressed Gaza reconstruction without displacing its population.
• European Union: The EU supports a two-state solution and is the largest donor to Palestinians. It lists Hamas as a terrorist organization, and its member states are divided over recognition of Palestine and measures on Israel.

Climate

The COP30 outcome was a compromise between Türkiye and Australia, both of which sought to host. Small island states and Pacific nations welcomed a Pacific-linked pre-COP. Developing countries emphasize climate finance, while the EU stresses faster emissions cuts.

Source Comparison

The same events are often described very differently depending on the source. Readers can test each claim against the primary documents listed below. The standards we apply are in Editorial Principles and Primary Source Standards.

An important caveat: Turkish officials combine strong moral language with institutional proposals, and the second is easier to assess than the first. Verifiable items are voting records, treaty texts and General Assembly resolutions. For other contested claims, see our Fact Check: Claims About Türkiye in International Media.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• P5 / veto: The five permanent members of the Security Council, each of which can block a substantive decision under Article 27 of the Charter.
• G4: Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, who seek permanent seats.
• Uniting for Consensus (UfC): A group of states that rejects new permanent seats. Türkiye is a member.
• Ezulwini Consensus: The African Union’s common position on Council reform.
• Zero Waste: A Turkish-led initiative on waste prevention and recycling, now recognized by the UN through 30 March.
• COP31: The 2026 UN climate conference, hosted by Türkiye in Antalya, with Australia leading the negotiations.
• OTS: The Organization of Turkic States, a cooperation body formerly known as the Turkic Council.

Related reading: Counter-Terrorism at the Source: Türkiye, UN Charter Article 51 and the Border Security Doctrine explains how Ankara applies the self-defence article it also cites in debates on Gaza. Monitor of Nations is the main hub, and About Monitor of Nations describes our mission and transparency standards.

Monitor of Nations presents Türkiye's official position and legal arguments alongside the perspectives of other states, and clearly identifies where an analysis reflects the Turkish viewpoint. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other national archives, and official statements, with links provided wherever possible.

— Monitor of Nations Editorial Team

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

• The Nations Dialogue: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Case and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — Understand Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' doctrine, the P5, L.69 and Uniting for Consensus positions, plus Zero Waste and COP31 climate diplomacy.
• Index of Nations: 'The World Is Bigger Than Five': Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Vision and COP31 Climate Diplomacy — How the UN Security Council and veto work, what G4, Uniting for Consensus and Africa propose, and Türkiye's 'world is bigger than five' thesis and COP31 role.
• Regional Order: The World Is Bigger Than Five: Türkiye's UN Security Council Reform Proposal, Gaza Diplomacy and COP31 — Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' case for UN Security Council reform, plus Gaza diplomacy, Zero Waste and COP31, explained with official sources.