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In-Depth Analysis· Türkiye Marine Spatial Planning IOC-UNESCO 2025 registration

Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration Explained

What is Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025? Scope, Finike MPA, legal effects, and Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU views.

MON
By Monitor of Nations Editorial Team
Published:
⏱ 11 min read (2,271 words)

Why It Matters

The 'Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye' is a national plan that sets out how Türkiye intends to organize and protect its seas, and it also serves as a statement of the maritime jurisdiction areas Ankara claims in the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. It was unveiled on 16 April 2025 and, according to Turkish officials, registered with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC-UNESCO) on 12 June 2025.

The registration matters politically because it places Türkiye's position on record with a UN body. It matters legally for a narrower reason: a planning document registered with a technical commission is not a boundary treaty, a court ruling or a UN endorsement of any claim. This guide explains both sides of that distinction.

Background

What marine spatial planning is

Marine spatial planning (MSP) is a public process for analysing and allocating human uses of sea space, such as shipping, fisheries, energy, tourism and conservation, to meet ecological, economic and social goals. IOC-UNESCO promotes MSP worldwide and, together with the European Commission, has issued guidance and a joint roadmap to encourage states to develop plans. In the EU, Directive 2014/89/EU obliges coastal member states to prepare maritime spatial plans. Türkiye is not an EU member, so its plan follows a national legal track.

Chronology of the Turkish plan

Date Event
2004 Türkiye begins submitting Eastern Mediterranean continental shelf coordinates to the UN
2009 and 2012 TPAO, the Turkish state petroleum company, receives exploration licences offshore
2011-09-21 Türkiye and the TRNC sign a Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement, two days after the Greek Cypriot administration began unilateral drilling
2019-11-27 Türkiye and Libya's Government of National Accord sign a Maritime Jurisdiction Delimitation MoU
2020-03-18 Türkiye formally registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
2025-04-16 Türkiye unveils the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye
2025-06-12 Registration with IOC-UNESCO, as announced by Ankara
2025-07-24 Presidential Circular establishes the Inter-Agency Coordination Board under the Foreign Ministry

The Eastern Mediterranean has no comprehensive maritime delimitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) provides that delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between states with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution (Articles 74 and 83). Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and maintains that customary international law and the principle of equity govern delimitation. Greece, Cyprus and all EU member states are parties to UNCLOS.

The central disagreement is about islands. Greece argues that its islands generate full maritime zones under UNCLOS (Articles 3, 57, 76 and 121). Türkiye argues that islands close to a mainland with a long coastline should not cut off the mainland's natural maritime projection, and that the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, about 870 km (540 miles), must be reflected in an equitable outcome.

What the Plan Contains

Scope

According to Turkish government sources, the plan covers Türkiye's seas in the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean and integrates sectoral uses with environmental protection. Ankara describes it as the legal and spatial expression of its Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) outlook, meaning the maritime jurisdiction areas it considers its own under international law. For the wider doctrine, see Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean: Maritime Jurisdiction, Equity and the Law of the Sea.

The Finike Marine Protected Area

Alongside the plan, Türkiye announced a Marine Protected Area off Finike on the Mediterranean coast. Ankara presents it as evidence that the plan is an environmental instrument as well as a jurisdictional one, and as an example of exercising governance responsibilities in waters it regards as its own. Critics note that environmental designations in disputed waters can carry political meaning, because they imply regulatory authority.

The 24 July 2025 Presidential Circular and the Coordination Board

A Presidential Circular dated 24 July 2025 set up an Inter-Agency Coordination Board with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as secretariat. Its purpose, as described by Ankara, is to coordinate ministries and agencies responsible for fisheries, energy, transport, environment, defence and foreign relations, so that implementation of the plan and Türkiye's maritime positions are consistent across government.

What the registration does and does not change

What it does:

  • Places the plan on record with a UN technical body, which Ankara says is the first time its position across all three seas has been so recorded.
  • Creates a documented, dated and publicly accessible statement of Türkiye's maritime planning area, useful as evidence of consistent state practice.
  • Strengthens Türkiye's argument that it has not acquiesced to rival claims, since it has protested and recorded its own position.

What it does not do:

  • It does not establish or certify any maritime boundary. IOC-UNESCO is a scientific and technical body and does not adjudicate delimitation.
  • It does not bind Greece, Cyprus, Egypt or any third state, which have not consented to it.
  • It does not replace delimitation by agreement, or by a court or tribunal, as envisaged in UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 and customary law.
  • It does not override existing agreements between other states, whose validity remains contested by Ankara but is asserted by the parties to them.

In other words, the registration is best read as a record of position and intent, not a source of title.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

Greece holds that maritime zones around its islands are governed by UNCLOS and that the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean should be delimited on that basis. Greek officials have stated that unilateral Turkish maps and plans have no legal effect on Greek sovereign rights and that the only legitimate dispute between the two countries is delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, ideally through negotiation or, failing that, referral to the International Court of Justice. Athens also points to its 2020 partial EEZ agreement with Egypt and to the Seville Map as reflecting its legal reading. Greek government statements and press commentary have criticized the Turkish plan as an attempt to create facts on the map.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

The Republic of Cyprus, internationally recognized as the government of the island, maintains that it holds sovereign rights in its EEZ under UNCLOS and has concluded EEZ delimitation agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010). It regards Turkish drilling and survey activity, and Turkish maritime claims that overlap its declared EEZ, as violations of its sovereign rights. Nicosia rejects the argument that Turkish Cypriots hold a separate claim to offshore resources outside a settlement, while saying revenues would benefit all Cypriots.

The European Union

EU institutions have repeatedly stated, in European Council conclusions on the Eastern Mediterranean, that they support the sovereignty and sovereign rights of member states and call for delimitation by dialogue and in line with international law. The EU treats UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law. Brussels has also said it is open to a constructive relationship with Türkiye if tensions ease.

Libya, Egypt and others

The 2019 Türkiye–Libya MoU remains contested; Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the EU objected to it, while Ankara and the Tripoli authorities that signed it defend it. Egypt and Greece's 2020 agreement overlaps part of the area covered by the Libya MoU. These overlaps show why a single registered plan cannot resolve the dispute alone.

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Türkiye's Position

According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency, Ankara's stance rests on the following points:

  • Equity, not maximalism. Ankara argues that delimitation must follow the principle of equity, coastal geography and proportionality, and that islands should not choke the maritime projection of a mainland with the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean. This is the line set out in Turkish MFA statements on maritime jurisdiction areas and on UNCLOS.
  • A documented, consistent record. The plan builds on Türkiye's UN notifications from 2004, the 21 September 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement, the 27 November 2019 Libya MoU and the 18 March 2020 registration of the outer limits of its continental shelf. Ankara says the IOC-UNESCO registration of 12 June 2025 extends this record to the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean together.
  • Turkish Cypriot rights. Ankara states that Turkish Cypriots, as co-founders and equal partners of the island under the 1960 arrangements, hold inherent rights over offshore hydrocarbons, with joint decision-making and revenue sharing. It points to the TRNC's hydrocarbon cooperation proposals of 2011, 2012 and 2019. See Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
  • Rejection of the Seville Map and EU competence. Ankara considers the Greek and Greek Cypriot 'Seville Map' a maximalist construction that would confine Türkiye to a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya, and argues the EU has no competence to settle delimitation disputes under the banner of Union solidarity. See What Is the Seville Map and Why Does Türkiye Reject It?.
  • Dialogue remains open. Türkiye points to President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and the Turkish Cypriots, and says no energy or security arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can last.

The legal basis Ankara invokes is customary international law on delimitation, the equity jurisprudence of international courts, and its persistent objector stance toward UNCLOS provisions it does not accept. Its national fleet, including the drillships Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni and Abdülhamid Han and the survey vessels Oruç Reis and Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa, is the operational side of that position.

Source Comparison

Issue Common framing in Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU sources Framing in Turkish official sources
Nature of the plan Unilateral map with no legal effect on third states National plan recorded with a UN body, consistent with Türkiye's long-standing notifications
Role of IOC-UNESCO A technical, non-adjudicating body whose platform does not validate claims A UN registration that, for the first time, records Türkiye's position in all three seas
Governing law UNCLOS, including Article 121, reflects customary law Customary law and equity; Türkiye is not a UNCLOS party
Islands Islands generate full maritime zones Islands near a mainland must not cut off its projection; proportionality applies
Turkish Cypriots Republic of Cyprus acts for the whole island and will share benefits in a settlement Turkish Cypriots hold equal, inherent rights now
Resolution route Negotiation or the International Court of Justice Equitable negotiation, with an all-coastal-states conference as a framework

Both sides agree on one point: the question can only be settled by agreement or adjudication. They differ on the legal reference points, on which parties must be at the table and on whether unilateral acts carry weight.

  • Marine spatial planning (MSP): a public process for allocating sea space among uses and protecting ecosystems. It is a planning tool, not a border treaty.
  • IOC-UNESCO: the UN's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, which supports ocean science and MSP guidance. It does not rule on maritime boundaries.
  • Continental shelf and EEZ: zones of coastal-state sovereign rights over the seabed and resources, up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) from baselines, subject to delimitation with neighbours.
  • Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan): the Turkish doctrine of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean.
  • TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983 and recognized only by Türkiye.
  • Persistent objector: a state that consistently objects to an emerging customary rule and so is not bound by it, a doctrine contested in its application.

Related reading:

Perspective Note

Monitor of Nations presents Türkiye's official position and legal arguments alongside the perspectives of other states, and clearly identifies where an analysis reflects the Turkish viewpoint. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other national archives, and official statements, with links provided wherever possible. Details of the registration are as announced by Turkish authorities; readers should consult the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IOC-UNESCO directly for the underlying documents.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is the Marine Spatial Planning of the Republic of Türkiye?

It is a national plan, unveiled on 16 April 2025, that organizes uses of Türkiye's seas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean and reflects Ankara's maritime jurisdiction position. It combines economic, environmental and security planning, and includes measures such as the Finike Marine Protected Area.

Did IOC-UNESCO endorse Türkiye's maritime claims?

No. According to Ankara, the plan was registered with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, but IOC-UNESCO is a technical body that does not validate or delimit maritime boundaries. Registration records Türkiye's position; it does not certify it.

Does the registration change any maritime boundary in the Eastern Mediterranean?

No. Under UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 and customary law, boundaries between states with opposite or adjacent coasts require agreement or adjudication. A unilateral plan, however well documented, does not bind Greece, Cyprus, Egypt or other third states.

What is the Inter-Agency Coordination Board?

It is a coordinating body established by a Presidential Circular dated 24 July 2025, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as secretariat. Its role is to align ministries and agencies so that implementation of the plan and Türkiye's maritime policy stay consistent.

How have Greece, the Greek Cypriot administration and the EU reacted?

Greek and Greek Cypriot officials contend that unilateral Turkish maps have no legal effect on their sovereign rights and that their maritime zones derive from UNCLOS, while EU institutions have repeatedly backed member states' sovereign rights and called for delimitation under international law. Ankara replies that equity, the longest coastline in the region and Turkish Cypriot rights must be reflected, and that the EU has no competence to settle delimitation.

Is Türkiye willing to negotiate maritime delimitation?

Ankara says yes, on the basis of equity and with all relevant parties, including the Turkish Cypriots, at the table. It points to President Erdoğan's 2020 proposal for an Eastern Mediterranean conference and the TRNC's earlier revenue-sharing proposals as evidence of that openness.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Monitor of Nations presents Türkiye's official position and legal arguments alongside the perspectives of other states, and clearly identifies where an analysis reflects the Turkish viewpoint. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other national archives, and official statements, with links provided wherever possible.

Author: Monitor of Nations Editorial TeamAbout Monitor of Nations →Editorial Principles →

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