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In-Depth Analysis· what is the Seville Map Eastern Mediterranean

What Is the Seville Map and Why Does Türkiye Reject It?

The Seville Map: a 2004 Eastern Mediterranean claims map that would confine Türkiye to a strip in the Gulf of Antalya. The law, the EU role, Ankara's case.

MON
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⏱ 10 min read (2,192 words)

Why It Matters

The Seville Map is a 2004 academic map of the Eastern Mediterranean that gives Greek and Greek Cypriot islands maximum maritime zones, and in doing so would squeeze Türkiye's continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) into a narrow strip in the Gulf of Antalya. It matters because it has become shorthand for a wider dispute over whether small islands lying next to a large mainland coast can generate full maritime zones, and over who has the authority to decide. The answer shapes energy exploration, naval deployments, EU–Türkiye relations and the rights of Turkish Cypriots.

Background

What the map is

The Seville Map comes from a study by researchers at the University of Seville, dated 2004, which applied a maximalist reading of island entitlements across the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. It treats islands such as Kastellorizo (Meis), Rhodes, Karpathos and Crete, and the island of Cyprus as administered by the Greek Cypriot side, as generating full continental shelf and EEZ rights. The result is a Greek–Cypriot maritime corridor stretching close to the Turkish mainland coast, leaving Türkiye with a limited zone in the Gulf of Antalya. It is an academic product and not a legally binding EU act. It has, however, been cited and circulated in Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU institutional discussions, and Ankara treats it as a political reference point for those claims.

The geography behind the dispute

Kastellorizo is a small island only about 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Turkish coast and several hundred kilometres from the Greek mainland. Türkiye has about 870 km (540 miles) of coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean, the longest of any state in the basin. That asymmetry between a long mainland coast and a tiny, distant island is the core of the legal argument.

Key chronology

Date Event
1958 / 1982 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf and UNCLOS set out shelf and EEZ rules; Türkiye did not become party to UNCLOS
2003 Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)–Egypt EEZ agreement, which Türkiye says overlaps its continental shelf
2004 Seville study and map produced; Türkiye begins registering Eastern Mediterranean shelf coordinates with the UN
2007 / 2010 Greek Cypriot EEZ agreements with Lebanon and Israel
21 Sep 2011 Türkiye–TRNC Continental Shelf Delimitation Agreement
27 Nov 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction MoU
18 Mar 2020 Türkiye registers the outer limits of its continental shelf with the UN
6 Aug 2020 Greece–Egypt partial EEZ agreement
16 Apr / 12 Jun 2025 Türkiye announces its Marine Spatial Planning and records it with IOC-UNESCO

UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 require that EEZ and continental shelf delimitation between states with opposite or adjacent coasts be effected by agreement on the basis of international law to achieve an equitable solution. Article 121 says islands generate maritime zones, but rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own have no EEZ or shelf. Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS and has long maintained that it is not bound by provisions it considers inconsistent with customary law on equity, though it accepts that the customary principles of delimitation apply. Greece (which ratified UNCLOS in 1995) and the Republic of Cyprus are parties, as is the EU as an organisation.

Case law shows that island effect is a matter of degree, not an automatic entitlement:

  • North Sea Continental Shelf cases (ICJ, 1969): delimitation must follow equitable principles; geography is not remodelled, but coastal configuration can justify correction.
  • Anglo-French Channel arbitration (1977): the Channel Islands, close to the French coast, were confined to an enclave rather than given full zones.
  • Libya/Tunisia (1982): the Kerkennah Islands were given only partial effect.
  • Libya/Malta (1985): the ICJ declined to give an equidistance line without testing the result against proportionality.
  • Romania v. Ukraine (2009): Serpents' Island was given no effect on the delimitation line.
  • Bangladesh v. Myanmar (ITLOS, 2012): St Martin's Island, near the mainland coast, was given no effect on the boundary.

These precedents are the basis of the argument that the Seville Map's maximalist treatment of islands is not a neutral application of the law.

Key Players & Positions

Greece

According to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, islands are entitled to a full continental shelf and EEZ under UNCLOS Article 121 and customary law, and Greece sees no legal basis for a different treatment of Kastellorizo or any other inhabited island. Athens has repeatedly stated that the only dispute it recognises with Türkiye is the delimitation of the continental shelf and EEZ, and that it is ready to take it to the International Court of Justice. Greece also holds that the Türkiye–Libya MoU of 2019 ignores Greek islands such as Crete and is legally void. It concluded a partial EEZ agreement with Egypt in August 2020.

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot administration)

The Greek Cypriot administration, which the UN, EU and most states treat as the Republic of Cyprus, states that it has sovereign rights over hydrocarbons in its declared EEZ and has licensed blocks to international energy companies. It holds that its EEZ agreements with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007) and Israel (2010) are valid and that Turkish Cypriots will benefit from resources after a settlement.

The European Union

European Council conclusions on the Eastern Mediterranean have expressed solidarity with Greece and Cyprus, called for respect for the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU member states, and supported delimitation by dialogue in good faith and under international law, including UNCLOS. The EU has declared Türkiye's drilling in the waters claimed by Cyprus illegal and has introduced a sanctions framework for that activity. The EU institutions do not formally adopt the Seville Map as a legal text, but officials and parliamentarians have cited the study in discussions.

Other regional actors

Egypt, Israel and Lebanon have each concluded EEZ arrangements with the Greek Cypriot side. Egypt signed a partial EEZ agreement with Greece in 2020. Libya's Tripoli-based government concluded the 2019 MoU with Türkiye, while other Libyan institutions have contested it.

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Türkiye's Position

  • Islands cannot cut off a mainland's maritime projection. Ankara argues, in successive Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements on the Eastern Mediterranean, that small islands lying within a mainland's natural coastal projection cannot be given full EEZ and continental shelf rights at the expense of a state with the longest coast. Its legal basis is the equitable-principles line of the 1969 North Sea cases, the 1977 Channel arbitration and later ICJ and ITLOS practice described above.
  • Delimitation is by agreement on the basis of equity, not by map. The Turkish Foreign Ministry stresses that delimitation must be negotiated between the states concerned under customary international law and the equity and proportionality principles that UNCLOS Articles 74 and 83 reflect. Ankara considers the Seville Map an attempt to pre-determine the outcome and regards it as legally void as against Türkiye. It also notes it has registered its shelf coordinates with the UN since 2004 and formally registered the outer limits of its continental shelf on 18 March 2020.
  • The EU has no competence over delimitation. According to Ankara, maritime delimitation between sovereign states is a matter of international law, not EU law, and the Union cannot adopt one member's maximalist claims under 'Union solidarity'. The EU's exclusive competences, such as conservation of marine biological resources in the common fisheries policy, do not extend to settling boundaries. Türkiye has therefore rejected European Council conclusions that adopt those claims.
  • Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights over the island's resources. Under the 1960 partnership framework and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Ankara says Turkish Cypriots are co-owners of Cyprus with equal rights over offshore hydrocarbons. This is why Türkiye signed the 21 September 2011 continental shelf agreement with the TRNC and why it opposes unilateral Greek Cypriot EEZ agreements. See Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. The TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 proposals for a joint committee and revenue sharing, and President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean conference including all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots, remain on the table.
  • Türkiye has anchored its position in a UN body. Ankara unveiled its Marine Spatial Planning on 16 April 2025 and recorded it with IOC-UNESCO on 12 June 2025, presenting this as the first time its maritime jurisdiction position across the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean has been registered with a UN body. See Türkiye's Marine Spatial Planning and the 2025 IOC-UNESCO Registration. Its Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine is explained in Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Türkiye also points to its fleet of drilling vessels (Fatih, Yavuz, Kanuni, Abdülhamid Han) and seismic ships (Oruç Reis, Barbaros Hayreddin Paşa) as an exercise of rights on its own continental shelf and on behalf of Turkish Cypriots, and states that no energy arrangement that excludes Türkiye and the TRNC can be durable.

Source Comparison

Question Greek / Greek Cypriot / EU sources Turkish primary sources
Status of the Seville Map Cited as an expert study consistent with UNCLOS island entitlements Academic product with no legal force, used to pre-empt negotiation
Island effect Islands generate full zones under Article 121 Effect is limited by equity and proportionality; case law gives reduced or no effect to small islands near a mainland
Applicable law UNCLOS as customary law; ICJ as the forum Customary law and equity; Türkiye is not a UNCLOS party; agreement between neighbours
Role of the EU Member-state sovereign rights are an EU concern; solidarity is justified No EU competence over delimitation; solidarity cannot create legal title
Turkish Cypriots Resources to be shared after a settlement Equal co-owners now; 2011 TRNC agreement; revenue-sharing proposals
Way forward Dialogue under international law or ICJ referral Negotiation on equity, a regional conference including Turkish Cypriots

Media and think-tank coverage in the EU frequently presents the dispute as a Turkish challenge to EU members' UNCLOS rights, and often omits that Türkiye is not a party to the Convention or the Turkish Cypriot dimension. Turkish sources typically stress the geographic imbalance and the equity case law, and sometimes under-explain Greece's position that Article 121 applies to all inhabited islands. Readers should compare the treaty texts (UNCLOS, the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee) and court judgments with official statements from both sides. For more on how claims are tested, see Fact Check: Claims About Türkiye in International Media and the Editorial Principles.

  • Continental shelf: the seabed and subsoil extending from a coastal state's land territory, in which it has sovereign rights over resources.
  • EEZ (exclusive economic zone): a zone up to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km) where the coastal state has sovereign rights over living and non-living resources.
  • Island effect: the degree to which an island is allowed to influence a maritime boundary; courts have often given islands reduced or no effect when they would distort an equitable result.
  • Equity and proportionality: the principles that a delimitation should produce an equitable result and reflect the relationship between coastal lengths and the maritime areas allocated.
  • Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland): Türkiye's doctrine on its maritime jurisdiction areas in the Black Sea, Aegean and Mediterranean.
  • TRNC: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed 15 November 1983, whose Turkish Cypriot people Ankara regards as co-owners of the island.

Related guides: Blue Homeland and the Eastern Mediterranean, Marine Spatial Planning and IOC-UNESCO Registration, Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Why Did the Annan Plan and Crans-Montana Fail? and the Monitor of Nations home page.

Monitor of Nations presents Türkiye's official position and legal arguments alongside the perspectives of other states, and clearly identifies where an analysis reflects the Turkish viewpoint. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other national archives, and official statements, with links provided wherever possible.

Cross-Publication Dossiers & Sister Desk Perspectives

For complementary primary-source analysis across our specialist editorial network, consult:

Frequently asked questions

What is the Seville Map?

The Seville Map is a 2004 academic map produced by a University of Seville team that assigns full continental shelf and EEZ rights to Greek and Greek Cypriot islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. Applied literally, it leaves Türkiye with only a narrow zone in the Gulf of Antalya. It is not a binding EU legal act, but it has been cited in Greek, Greek Cypriot and EU discussions.

Why does Türkiye reject the Seville Map?

Ankara argues that islands close to a mainland cannot cut off that mainland's maritime projection, and that delimitation must follow equity and proportionality, as in the 1969 North Sea cases and the 1977 Channel arbitration. It also says Turkish Cypriots hold equal rights over Cyprus's offshore resources and that the map ignores them.

Is Türkiye bound by UNCLOS?

Türkiye is not a party to UNCLOS, and it argues that the Convention's provisions are not opposable to it where they conflict with customary law. Customary delimitation principles, including equity and proportionality, still apply. Greece, Cyprus and the EU are UNCLOS parties and argue that Article 121 gives islands full zones.

Does the EU have authority over maritime boundaries?

Maritime delimitation between states is made by agreement or by a court under international law, not by EU institutions. The EU has exclusive competence over certain matters such as marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy. Ankara therefore rejects the EU adopting its members' claims as 'Union solidarity'; Athens and Nicosia say they are defending the sovereign rights of member states.

How could the dispute be resolved?

Greece has proposed taking the delimitation to the International Court of Justice, while Türkiye proposes direct negotiation on equity and a regional conference that includes all coastal states and Turkish Cypriots, as President Erdoğan suggested in 2020. Neither approach has so far produced an agreed framework, and Cyprus remains a separate unresolved issue.

Perspective & Editorial Transparency Note

Monitor of Nations presents Türkiye's official position and legal arguments alongside the perspectives of other states, and clearly identifies where an analysis reflects the Turkish viewpoint. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, Ottoman and other national archives, and official statements, with links provided wherever possible.

Author: Monitor of Nations Editorial TeamAbout Monitor of Nations →Editorial Principles →

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